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Abstract 
Chinese Approaches to 
Institutionalizing Regional Multilateralism 1 
Chien-peng Chung 
Department of Politics and Sociology 
Lingnan University 
Over the last lew yea悶， China has promoted all kinds 01 regional and 
S的-regional cooperation in Asia. However, the extent 01 China 's drive 
lor i削itutionalization 01 cooperative regional multilateral processes is 
linúted by two realist considerations: 1) Distribution 01 power among 
the forum partic伊仰的， and whether the m句ior players are well-
disposed towards China or not so and 11) the importance 01 the issues 
that the specific lorum is set up to deal with, parti叫larly to the 
political, economic or security interests 01 China， 的t also that olother 
participating states 
China has succes功lly pushed lor a high degree 01 institutionalization 
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) because the only 
other m可or participant 仰的sia) is a friend, and members haνe a 
salien.t accord in pu叮叮咚 the aims 01 α叫-terrorislη and trade 
promotion. The Six-Party Talks (6P刃 is minimally institutionalized 
because, although the issue 01 nuc/ear disarmament 01λTorth Korea is 
im.portant to China, there are many heavy players with their own 
agenda in the lorum (U S., Japan, and Russi呵， North Korea itself is a 
maverick, and the participants have yet to take concrete steps in 
resolving many issues pertaining to λTorth Korea giving up its nuc/ear 
weapons program. The semi-institutionalized character 01 the ASEAN 
+ 3 r可lects the consultative nature 01 the lorum that leaders 01 the 
Association 01 Southeast Asian Nations (注SEAN) and China, Japan and 
I This paper was written with the help of my research assistant; Fong Pui Chi. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the tinancial support of the Lingnan University Research and 
Postgraduate Studies Committee for the funding of this project. Readers are invited to 
share comments on this first draft with the author (cp2chung@LN.edu.hk) 
South Korea have decided upon, and competition for injluence between 
China and Japan. To increase cooperation with ASEAN without the 
presence of foreign powers, China has worked towards 
institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN axis within the rubric of 
ASEAN + 3. 
Over the last few years, a major development in international politics 
has been the institutionalization of several regional multilateral 
processes in Northeast, East and Central Asia, with the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) as a prime mover of this development. 
Institutionalization helps promote greater international cooperation, but 
the process occurs only when actors make a conscious and public 
decision to create a specific ruled-based organizational form to 
facilitate their cooperation. The potential for institutionalization thus 
depends on the actors who are entitled to participate, the distribution of 
power held by these actors, their interests in establishing 
institutionalized cooperation, and the characteristics of the issue-area to 
be addressed,2 in constituting.a multilateral regime. 
A multilateral regime refers to a set of mutual expectations, rules and 
regulations, organization plans, efforts and commitments that have 
been accepted by a group of states.3 Multilateral regimes are formed for 
the purpose of promoting cooperation among states with shared 
interests, establishing expectations of pa位erns of behavior, and 
reducing transaction and search costs. 4 Such collective arrangements 
are tumed to by states when national objectives cannot be achieved 
unilaterally or through bilateral arrangements. It is not necessary for the 
constituent states of a regime to share similar values or outlooks，的
long as they share common policy pu中oses.
2 Michael E. Smith, Europe 法 Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of 
Cooperatio l1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40 
3 .Iohn Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polify: Essays on international 
institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 56 
4 Robert O. Keohan巴， After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 79-95 . 
2 
The most elemental evidence of institutionalization is a clearer 
articulation of the functional goals and behavioral norms of the regime. 
This usually involves creating a greater number of norms, clarifying 
those norms in more detail, changing from informal norms to formal 
rules, and bringing more rules and permanent forums into the process. 5 
The establishment of a permanent organization to administer some 
policy domain represents an additional degree of institutionalization 
beyond a decentralized communications network and a set of rules to 
guide actors. 6 An organization is thus a relatively stable group of 
officials bound by a common purpose, which often extends to concrete 
entities with headquarter丸 permanent staffs, budgets, internal 
procedures, and other resources that can shape policies or norms.7 
The political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has devised several criteria 
for measuring political institutionalization in an organization: 8 1) the 
longer an organization has been in existence, the higher the level of 
institutionalization. 2) An organization that has survived one or more 
changes in its principal functions is more institutionalized than one that 
is not. 3) The more complex an organization is, the more 
institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of 
organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally , and 
differentiation of separate types of the organizational subunits. 4) 
Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the 
development of political organizations and procedures that are more 
than just expressions of the interests of a particular individual, family , 
clan or social group. 
The above measurements are yardsticks against which China' s 
achievements in institutionalizing regional multilateral regimes in the 
Asian region can be appraised. China's invo\vement in constructing 
multilateral regimes or institutions reflects not only an aspiration to 
5 Smith, Europe 's Foreign and Security Policy, 38-39 
6 Smith, Europe 's Foreign and Security Policy, 46 
7 Smith, Europe 's Foreign and Securify Policy, 46 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, Po /i tical Order in Changing Society (New Haven and London 
Yale University Press, 1968), 12-20 
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shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation,9 but also its 
increasing level of comfort in subscribing to norms of predictable and 
interdependent behavior among states. 10 So doing also advances 
China's national interest and projects its in f1uence by raising its 
positive profile and dispelling concerns and misgivings about China' s 
growing economic and military strengths." Apart from China's rising 
power, its expanding diplomatic in f1uence and increasing activism in 
regional multilateral institutions, some of which do not involve the 
United States, is recognized as a key development in Asian affairs. 
As recently as ten years ago , academic conventional wisdom held that 
the government of the PRC conducted its diplomacy at multilateral 
economic and security forums in the East Asia-Westem Pacific region 
in a tepid manner, and opposed efforts at institutionalizing these forums , 
for fear that giving them structure would constrain its own" national 
interests and lead to its sovereignty claims over Taiwan being 
questioned. 
Between 1997 and 2001 , the Chinese government' s perception of 
regional and particularly security-related multilateral organizations 
evolved from suspicion, to uncertainty, to supportiveness. 12 China's 
increasingly positive assessment of regional dialogue groups aríd 
organizations principally re f1ects its evolving recognition that these 
institutions are neither intrinsically hostile to China nor potential tools 
of the U .S. set on constraining it. 13 China has in fact come to realize 
。 Kuik Cheng-Chwee,“Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: lts Evolution, 
Characteristics, and Aspiration," Contemporary Soulheast Asia 27, nO . l (2005): 119 
10 This point was made by Alastair lan Johnston in his chapter on “ Socialization in 
Intemational Institutions: The ASEAN Way and lntemational Relations Theory." in 
lnternational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pac拆c， ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael 
Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press、 2003) ， 107-162. Johnston was 
describing China 's willingness to be "socializ巴d" into certain norms adopted by member 
states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but the parallel is close enough to be 
applied here 
11 Wang Jianwei , “ China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Mi J1ennium," in China 
Rising: Power and λ1otivation in Chinese Foreign Policy , ed. Yong Deng and Fei-ling 
Wang (Lanham Ma: Rowman & Littlefield , 2005). 188 
12 David Shambaugh, “ China Engages Asia," lnternational Securi紗， Vo l. 29, No .3 
(Winter 2004/05), 68-69 
13 Shambaugh, 
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that these groupings wish to engage China in the long-term, are open to 
Chinese perspectives on preserving sovereignty norms and seeking 
cooperative rather than collective security in interstate discourse, and 
may even be of use in balancing U.S. power and influence in the region. 
Diplomats from the Department of Asian Affairs of the PRC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs who attended various official multilateral forums led 
the way in convincing their bureaucratic superiors and national leaders 
that China' s cooperation in multilateral settings help reassure others of 
its best intentions and avert hostile reactions to its growing power. 14 By 
1999-2000, Chinese intemational affairs experts concluded that for a 
peaceful environment conducive to domestic political stability and 
economic development to take place, China needed to be more 
proactive in shaping its regional environment and pursuing a “Good 
Neighbor Policy."的
Overcoming traditional nationalistic sensitivities and fears of possible 
obstructionist policies being pursued by some foreign countries in 
multilateral forums , China's third generation leaders under Jiang Zemin 
perceived that China should discharge its responsibilities in 
international society commensurate with its status and in f1uence as a 
rising power with one-fifth of the world's population. 16 More than 
anything else, this understanding has led to China's late but full-blown 
participation in a plethora of regional multilateral organizations. 
China's leaders have given multilateral cooperation a prominent place 
in its national security doctrine, which envisages the development of a 
virtuous cycle of mutual security through cooperative means. China has 
since successfully tied its national economic and security interest and 
international standing to its promotion of multilateral cooperative 
14 Susan L. Shirk, “ China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific," U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 
Technology Power: Implications for U.S. Economic and Security lnterests," February 12-
13 ‘ 2004, 1 
15 Zhu Tingchang, “ Lun Zhongguo mulin zhengce and lilun yu shijian," (“On the theory 
and practice ofChina's neighborly policy,") Zhongguo Waijiao (Chinese Foreign -1那rirs) ，
August 2001 :8 , 18 
16 Wang Yizhou,‘'Zhongguo yu guoji zuzhi guanxi yanjiu and ruogan wenti ," (“Several 
issues concerning the study of China's involvement with international organizations," 
Zongguo Waijiao (China 's Foreign Relations), August 2002: 11 , 51 , 54 
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strategies and organizations, as a fonn of “ sovereignty enlargement" 
and “extension of nationalism." 17 
To convince Asian states that China's rise will not threaten the present 
regional order and their national interests, and to use its role and 
diplomacy in Asia as a launch pad for greater influence in world affairs, 
China has eagerly promoted all kinds of regional and sub-regional 
cooperation in Asia. China is making active and skillful use of regional 
multilateral economic and security institutions, such as the ASEAN+ 3 
( 10+ 3) / ASEAN + China (10+ 1),18 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), and Six-Party Talks (6PT) , where PRC officials regularly attend 
summit meetings, ministerial conferences, and working conferences, to 
accelerate regional integration and cooperation with neighboring states. 
ln the process of Asian integration, China is playing the role of the 
leading state, or that of the principal facilitator or mediator, with the 
support or at least acquiescence ofthe U.S. , Russia, Japan, and ASEAN, 
to further the process of structuralizing or institutionalizing the 6PT, 
SCO and the 10+311 0+ 1. 
According to Fu Ying, former Director-General of the PRC Foreign 
Ministry's Department of Asian Affairs and current PRC Ambassador 
to Australia, China supports de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula 
and wiU establish a framework to strengthen regional cooperation with 
ASEAN+ 3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as two key 
points. 19 The PRC will also ca汀Y out political and security dialogues 
and cooperation within the structure of ASEAN+3 , and will continue ω 
push for trilateral cooperation involving China, Japan and Korea. L. V 
Both the ASEAN+ 3 and ASEAN+ 1 processes have been managed 
since the mid -1990s within the same PRC F oreign Ministry apparatus, 
17 Xiao Chengfeng, “ Revamping China's Multilateral Strategy in East-Asi an Region: 
From A New Regionalism Approach," JnterReview (Shanghai Institute of Intemational 
Stud ies) 2004: 1, 2 
I X In this article, the terms ASEAN+3 and 10+3 are used interchangeably, as are the terms 
ASEAN + China, ASEAN+ 1, and 10+ 1, as all tbese terms are invariably used in the 
scholarly literature to refer to these processes 
19 Fu Ying, “China and ASEAN in a New Era," Chi月a: An International Journal Yo J. 1 
No. 2 (Sep.2003): 310-311 
20 Fu, “ China and ASEAN in a New Era，'、 31 1.
6 
namely, the Division for Regional' Cooperation of the Asian 
Departm ent. 21 
1n keeping with the measures laid out at the beginning, the degree of 
institutionalization of a regional multilateral organization is more or 
less collectively determined by an upward index of objectives outlined 
and achieved, established norms and procedures or written set of rules, 
presence or size of physical structures or a permanent staff, committees 
created, regularity and level of meetings, and longevity. lt is difficult to 
address the issue of age, since the organizations under analysis are a11 
created within the last ten years. However, not withstanding China's 
obvious enthusiasm for helping to establish, develop and structuralize 
regional multilateral organizations, it is apparent that the 6PT, 10+3 
and SCO reflect low, middle and high levels of institutionalization. 
(See Appendix) This is even though the forums have become 
progressively institutionalized as the four party talks (4PT) transformed 
into the six party talks (6PT), the Shanghai-5 expanded to become the 
SCO, and China's relations with ASEAN consolidated within the 10+3 
structure into the 10+ 1. 
This paper assert that the extent of China's push for institutionalization 
of cooperative regional multilateral processes rests primarily on two 
rather realist considerations: I) Distribution of power among the forum 
participants, and whether the m吋or players are well-disposed towards 
China or not so and II) the importance of the issues that the specific 
forum is set up to deal with, particularly in relation to the political, 
economic or security interests of China, but also that of other 
participating states. The process of institutionalizing the 6PT, SCO and 
the concurrent 10+311 0+ 1, and the obstacles faced in their structural 
development, serves to show up these differences. 
This paper could find no support for the popular claims that either 
membership size of a multilateral organization affects the degree of 
cooperation among its participants, or that China has a certain 
preference for institutionalizing economic multilateral forums but not 
2 1 Kuik, ' ‘Multilateralism in China' s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and 
Aspiration," 1 04 
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security-oriented ones, although it is true that China will not allow the 
status of Taiwan to be discussed at any of these forums , which it 
considers to be an internal affairs of the Chinese nation. We shall retum 
to these two claims at the conclusion. 
This study looks at China's involvement in constructing and 
institutionalizing regional inter-governmental multilateral regimes or 
structures, centered on Asian countries, and aimed at addressing 
regional challenges; namely, the 4PT/6PT, Shanghai-5/Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, and ASEAN+ 3/ ASEAN+ 1. Reasons why 
other multilateral institutions that involve China, such as the Asean 
Regional Forum (ARF) , Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), are excluded from this discussion are 
that they are not primarily driven by China, and are really inter-regional 
or inter-continental organizations that are largely forums for 
discussions and consultative in nature. The interests, concerns and 
values of the countries involved are just too diverse for any degree of 
institutionalization to occur. To call the APEC or ARF regional 
institutions is really to stretch the term “regional" to breaking point -
unless the vast Pacific Ocean is to be considered the heart of a 
“region," and the ASEM countries are geographically non-contiguous. 
Although the U.S. is not geographically part of East Asia, heavy East 
Asian trade dependence on the U.S. , plus its network of alliances and 
commitments in the region left over from the Cold War, makes it a 
power with compelling regional interests and concerns in East Asia. 
China's Approaches to the 4PT / 6PT 
The 4PT and the subsequent 6PT flowed out ofthe failure to fulfill the 
terms of the Framework Accord reached in 1994 between the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, and 
the US, under which North Korea would give up its nuclear-weapons 
making capabilities, in exchange for fuel oil deliveries fro111 the US and 
assistance to build two light-water reactors from Japan and South 
Korea. The 4PT between the US , North Korea, China and South Korea 
on keeping the Korean peninsula nuclear“ free, held in three preparatory 
meetings and six rounds of talks between December 1997 and August 
8 
1999, failed largely because North Korea had wanted direct talks with 
the US, which was also China's position then, while the US had wanted 
to involve at least Japan, if not Russia as well , in the talks, especially if 
economic incentives or sanctions were to be considered as options to 
induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. 
Since the North Korean leadership admitted to visiting US Assistant 
Secretary James Kelly in October 2002 that the DPRK was enriching 
uranium for nuclear weapons, then expe l1ed the lnternational Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who monitored North Korea's 
compliance with the Accord, and in January 2003 , withdrew from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the US had wanted the 
nuclear issue settled tlrrough multilateral diplomacy, while North Korea 
wanted to conclude a bilateral non-aggression treaty with the US. By 
providing a neutral “good office," and brokering a trilateral talk among 
the US, DPRK and China in April 2003 , as a compromise for the other 
two pm1ies, China played a pivoted role in breaking the standoff. The 
US then impressed upon an initially reluctant China the need to host an 
expanded series of talks comprising the six parties of the US , China, 
North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia. 
To bring all parties of the proposed 6PT to the table, Chinese diplomats 
engaged in a flurry of “ shuttle diplomacy" between Pyongyang, 
Washington, Tokyo , Seoul and Moscow in July 2003. μ As host of the 
6PT, the Chinese spared no efforts to cater to the sensibilities of the 
negotiating parties. At the Beijing Diaoyutai State Guest House 
meeting venue, the six delegations were arranged in an alphabetical 
order around a large hexagonal table, with the DPRK diplomats sitting 
to the left of the US delegation and opposite the South Korean team. 23 
These shuttle and tabular arrangements would be the order of business 
for all subsequent 6PTs. 
After the second round of talks, China successfully pushed the 
participating states to set up a permanent working group of senior 
22 \Vang,“China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium ," 186 
23 Xinhua News Agency,“Handshakes and Smiling Faces Kick Off Six- Way Talks," 27 
August 2003. 
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officials, 24 and a自er both second and third rounds of talks, China 
issued a written Chairman' s Statement. 1n the latest fourth round, host 
Beij ing presented a joint document draft for the consideration of the 
delegates, but despite having to revise it twice, still could not get it 
accepted by all the participants before that round went into recess. 25 
Although the 6PT is conducted at the level of the deputy foreign 
minister of pat1icipating countries rather than the slightly lower rank of 
assistant foreign minister or ambassador at the 4PT, when the fOUl1h 
round went into recess after twelve days of negotiation on 6 August 
2005 , the 6PT is sti lI ad hoc or minimally institutionalized because: 
• Although the issue of nucIear disarmament of North Korea and 
the preservation of a nucIear-weapons-free Korean peninsula is 
important to China, the participants have yet to agree on what 
they should do to induce North Korea to give up its nucIear 
weapons program. 
• Although China was trusted enough by all participants to host the 
6PT, there are many heavy players in the forum with their own 
agenda. 
North Korea itself is a maverick and no other participant in 
the 6PT knows what it wi lI accept to give up its nuclear 
weapons program. N0l1h Korea has demanded US 
economic aid, security guarantees and diplomatic 
recognition prior to giving any promises of eliminating its 
nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang has not agreed to a 
Chinese draft proposal at the 4th round of the 6PT that 
would have required it to give up its entire nucIear program, 
even for electricity generation. 
US demands “complete, verifiable and inever吼叫e"
abandonment of North Korea's highly-enriched uranium 
; 4 叭W怕岫川/勻仙仙叫叫a釗m叫n嗯略1瑋芯gι川‘“℃叮叫叫‘℃叫叫Cα臼h圳1討in叭 Ml岫圳川u叫山JI山Itil伽a討仙州iω叫D凹ip抖loma旭c叮y ir叫eN 
Yu Yosh圳1叫it旭ake巳‘ “ Acc∞or吋d a叫 6ι-par吋ty talks still e叫lu沁凶S討ive ，刊 σS α h扣I. Cω0111 ，
lht叫t怕0 ://刀八w九叮'ww . as臼ahi甘i.com l旭en 立剖li沁凶s叫h/νHer悶al岫d-asahiνITKY200508030118 .htm1; Xinhua N恥的
Agency, ' ‘China presents draft for 6-party talks,'‘ 30 July 2005 
AU 
(HEU) program, as well as its plutonium program, either 
for weapons making or electricity generation, before it will 
provide that country with the security guarantees, including 
diplomatic recognition, that it had asked for. Washington 
opposes a peaceful nuclear power program for electricity 
generation out of proliferation concerns.26 
Japan wants to include human rights and past cases of 
abduction of Japanese citizens to North Korea in 6PT 
discussions. 
China considers North Korea a buffer state against US 
forces in South Korea and does not wish to see the collapse 
of the Kim Jong-il regime as a result of US coercive action 
on North Korea. 
South Korea has indicated that it is willing to supply the 
North with all of its electricity, and both Russia and China 
promised more economic aid, if Pyongyang pledges to give 
up its nuclear weapons program. 
China's leverage is by far the greatest because it is the 
major provider of food and fuel to the ma叫l抗扣伽m肌lction叫m
economy of No叫rt出h Korea. China, Russia and South Korea 
are against economic sanctions or military strikes against 
North Korea to coerce it into giving up its nuclear power 
program. 
. The Chinese, together with the Koreans, have strong memories of 
Japanese imperialism and its atrocities, and oppose the use of the 
N orth Korean nuclear issue or tenorism as a means for the 
Japanese government to justi方 an increased role for Japan's Self-
Defense F orces in regional security and international 
26 Associated Press,“New draft of joiot statement proposed at 6-pal1y talks," 
Jnternational HeraZd Tribune , 1 August 2005 
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peacekeeping activiti_es, as well as any augmentation of its 
military capabilities. ':'1 
• Even though China and the U.S. share the objective of a nuclear 
weapons-free Korean Peninsula, the interests and policies of 
China and the U.S. diverge across a number of important regional 
issues, notably U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and China's 
increasingly warm ties with ASEAN, Russia, and South Korea. 
China is now the largest trading partner of South Korea, a U.S. 
al1y, and the strong state of bilateral ties has been a key factor in 
forging the 6PT, as Beijing has been closely coordinating its 
position with Seoul in the talks. 28 
After the fOU1ih round of talks resumed on 13 September 2005 , the 
PRC presented the delegates with another draft, which was debated 
upon and accepted after six days. In the final Joint Statement, North 
Korea agreed in principle to halt its nuclear-weapons program, rejoin 
the NPT, and allow IAEA inspectors back into the country, while the 
US gave an assurance not to attack North Korea, and the other five 
countries promised to provide an unspecified amount of energy aid to 
North Korea. 29 lssues such as the peaceful use of nuclear energy by 
North Korea and the normalization of its relations with US and Japan 
are left for future discussions. Based on past behavior, there is every 
possibility that North Korea might renege on the dea1.30 To implement 
the commitments agreed upon, and work out remaining differences, 
further rounds of the 6PT will have to be held. 
China's Approaches to the 10+3/10+1 
The 10+3 forum was instituted when the leaders of China, Japan and 
South Korea met as a group with their counterpa1is from the 10 
27 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia," 93. 
28 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia," 80 
29 Reuters, “Nuclear Pact on shaky foundations ," South China Morning Post, 20 
September 2005 
30 Jae-soon Chang, “North Korea Oemands Nuke Reactor From U.S .," Associated Press, 
19 September 2005 
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countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 amidst the Asian financial crisis. The 
leaders issued their first “Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation" 
at the third 10+3 Summit held in Manila in November 1999, and set in 
motion a series of meetings between the foreign, finance and economic 
ministers of the grouping-3l 
As the original goal of the grouping was to stabilize East Asia ' s 
economies after the Asian crisis, the finance ministers of a11 10+3 states 
came together in the Thai city of Chiang Mai in 1999 to work out a 
regional cu叮ency-swap mechanism, by which the thirteen countries 
would lend one another part of their hard currency reserves if any of 
their cun-encies came under speculative pressure. The financial crisis 
which inspired the Chiang Mai lnitiative led to a series of meetings that 
in turn developed trust among the 10+3 countries. China enhanced its 
reputation in the region by maintaining the value of its currency and 
contributing to the lnternational Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package 
for Thailand. 
At the 61h ASEAN+ 3 Summit held in Phnom Penh on 4 November 
2002 , China announced that it would waive a11 or most of the debt 
owed to it by Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. By acting 
responsibly in not devaluing its cun-ency, as widely feared, and by 
offering aid packages and low-interest loans to several Southeast Asian 
countries, the PRC government did much to replace the image of China 
as aloof or arrogant with one of China as a helpful neighbor and 
responsible power, and the welcomed response bo~sted the confidence 
of China' s leaders in their roles as regional actors. ..J"< 
China' s interest in institutionalizing regional multilateral processes in 
Asia coincides w ith, and is propelled by, the substantial intensification 
of intra-regional trade and investment within the last two decades and 
the growth of regional production networks and supply chains centered 
31 Oavid Capie, “ Ri val Regions? East Asian Regionali sm and its Challenge to the Asia-
Pacifi丸" in Asia Pacifì c: A Regiu l1 in Transitiol1 , ed. .Tames Rolfe (Asia-Pacific Center of 
Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii 、 2004) 152 
32 Shambaugh, "China Engages As ia," 68 
13 
tìrst on Japan, 'and increasingly on China. 33 Asian leaders have been 
given a strong incentive, especiaIIy since the 1990s, to pursue closer 
relations to give the region balance against the possible development of 
exclusive blocs elsewhere, particularly in Europe and North America.34 
The stronger than expected growth of China and the recovery and 
strengthening of foreign direct investment between ASEAN and the 
other three countries are also significant forces in consolidating the 
grouping.35 There are also arguments increasingly made by East Asians 
that the region needs to develop a regional identity to balance the 
influence of the U.S. in Asia, increase its weight in the world and have 
a stronger voice in global tìnancial and trade institutions. 36 These 
material and ideational vectors for Asian regionalism have, if anything, 
become more salient as time passes. 
China has supported the formation of the East Asian Vision Group of 
academics in 1999, which came up with the blueprint report “Towards 
an East Asian Community刊 in 2002. China has also taken the initiative 
to push for the creation of a Network of East Asia Think-Tanks 
(NEAT). 37In November2001 , a group of experts a-Om member states 
of the ASEAN+ 3 presented a proposal to their leaders caIIing not only 
for trade and tìnancial liberalization, but also for strengthened 
cooperation in the political, security, social and cultural fields to create 
a regional community.38 At the 10+3 summit in 2002, China suggested 
that the ASEAN+ 3 process be expanded to include regional political 
33 Paul Evans, “Nascent Asian regionalism and lts Implications for Canada咱們 unpubli shed
manuscript prepared for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 's Roundtable on the 
Foreign Policy Dialogue and Canada-Asia Relations, 4. According to Evans, while intra-
Asian trade in the early 1980s was about 25% of all trade conducted by Asian countries, 
twenty y闊的 later, the fi gure had exceeded 50% 
34 Capie , ' ‘ Rival Regions? East Asian Regionalism and its Challenge to the Asia-Pacific," 
155 
35 Tran Van Hoa, Globalization, Crises and the Emergence of New Asian Regionalism 
Genesis and Current Development," in New Asian regionalism: Re!Jp onses 10 
Globalization, ed. Tran Van Hoa and Char1es Harvie (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave 
McMillan司 2004) ， 12-13 
36 Evans, ' ‘Nascent Asian regionalism and Jts lmplications for Canada," 5 
37 Kuik, '‘Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and 
Aspiration," 116 
38 Dirk Nabers、 “The Social Construction of intemational institutions: the case of 
ASEAN+3 ," Jnternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific, February L 2003; 3:1 ， 1 20、 132
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and security issues such as combating terrorism and other trans-national 
crime.39 Since then, ASEAN+3 has evolved into something much more 
complex, including the promotion of confidence-building measures and 
traditional and non-traditional security in the region. 40 At the 
ASEAN+3 Summit in October 2003 , PRC Premier Wen Jiabao 
formally enunciated a “ Good Neighbor Policy" for China specifically 
directed toward its Asian neighbors, which it had already been 
practicing since the 1980s, albeit then on a largely bilateral basis, and 
indicated that China is fully amendable to the “ASEAN Way" of 
incremental consensus building and group decision-making. Lately, 
South Korea has proposed creating an integrated ASEAN+ 3 “ e-
government center" in Seoul in 2006 to act as a bridge to smooth 
exchanges in such fields as human resources, technical suppo此，
education and training, a move that is supported by China.41 
On the verge of consolidating a distinct regional identity as the East 
Asian Community, ASEAN+3 promises much and is displaying signs 
of institutional consolidation. There are curren t1y 48 dialogue 
mechanisms under the 10+3 process, coordinating 16 areas of 
cooperation, which include economics, finance , foreign affairs, politics, 
security, labor, health, tourism, environment, agriculture, forestry , 
social welfare, energy, transnational crime, information and 
communications technology (ICT) and youth affairs. By April 2005 , 16 
bilateral cu訂ency swap arrangements have been signed under the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, amounting to US$37.5 billion, although this 
represents only a mere fraction of the combined foreign exchange 
reserves of around US$2.5 trillion at the disposal of East Asian states.42 
39 Joi nt Communiqué of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3) 8angkok, 10 January 2004; 
ilttp ://www.asean sec.or~/ 15 645 . htm 
40 Nabers. "The Social Construction of intemational institutions: the case of ASEAN+3 ," 
126 
41 Xinhua News Agency,“ASEAN Plus Three e-government center likel y to be set up in 
Seoul ," May 26. 2005 
42 Chr甘心pher M. Dent, “ Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia," 
China Quarter妝， 182, May 2005 , 390-391 
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However, despite talks of setting up a free trade area, an Asian Bonds 
Market that would issue bonds denominated in local cunencies,43 and 
an Asian Monetary Fund type of financial arrangement,44the grouping 
has arguably delivered relatively little so far.的 Although there are 
regular meetings of 10+3 leaders , ministers , and senior officials, and 
documents to set and record the agenda of these meetings, there is no 
secretariat, permanent staff, binding agreement, or written set of rules 
to structure the grouping. 
The semi-institutionalized character of the 10+3 principally ref1ects 
several factors: 
. The preference exhibited by the leaders and ministers of the 10 
ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea for 
maintaining the consensual-building approach of the forum and 
non-binding nature of understandings reached - the fabled 
“ASEAN Way" 一 to avoid or minimize open con f1 ict. 
• Except for Malaysia's erstwhile Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohammed, almost a11 the other leaders of ASEAN were not in 
favor of creating a separate 10+3 secretariat,46 for fear of diluting 
ASEAN's own in f1uence within the enlarged grouping, but 
consented to the establishment of a 10+3 Unit within the existing 
ASEAN Secretariat in December 2003 to coordinate and monitor 
10+ 3 cooperation. 
• China's proposal at the sixth 10+3 Summit in November 2002, 
which suggested that the 10+ 3 process be expanded from 
economic cooperation to include regional political and security 
的 Dent， “Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia，叫 392
44 Nabers, “ The Social Construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN+3 ," 
130 
的 Mark Beeson,“ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism," 
Contempor01y Soulheast Asia, Volume 25 , Number 2, August 2003 , 264. 
46 Alice D. Ba司“The Politics and Economics of ‘East Asia ' in ASEAN-China Relations," 
in China and Soulheasl Asia、 ed . Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (lnstitute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2005), 181 
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issues such as combating tetrorism and other trans-national crime, 
may actually have diffused the focus of the process. 
• Even though the 10+3 countries have developed a non-traditional 
security agenda for cooperation and consultation, to address 
“piracy, drug-trafficking, illegal migration, smuggling of small 
arms, money laundering, cyber crime, international terrorism and 
other issues affecting human security，"的 they have been very 
cautious about expanding cooperation or even discussion beyond 
a non-traditional security agenda, for fear of provoking US 
concerns that it will tum into an institution that provides China 
with a vehicle to dominate East Asian politics and undermine US 
presence and interest in the region. 
• Head-to-head competition for inf1uence in Southeast Asia 
between China and J apan, and J apan' s refusal so far to acquiesce 
in China's leadership in the 10+3. 
One ofthe main reasons for Japan's participation in 10+3 is 
to balance or dilute the inf1 uence of China in Southeast 
Asia, which Japan has for decades considered to be its 
investment destination, export platform, and resource area. 
By aggressively pursuing a strong China-ASEAN axis 
within the 10+3 since the 2001 to establish a free trade area 
(FTA) between China and ASEAN, China has triggered 
strong competition between itself and Japan for in f1 uence in 
Southeast Asia. 48 Observers widely see the Japanese 
govemment' s decision to set up a study group to look into 
the conclusion of a “closer economic partnership" with 
ASEAN as a belated a仕empt to compete and catch up with 
China' s proposal for the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
47 ‘ 'Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress ," East 
Asian Vi sion Group (EA YG) Report (2002), 21 
48 Markus Hund, “ ASEAN Plus Three: towards a new age of pan-Asian regionalism? A 
skeptic ‘ s apprai sal ," Pac!戶c Review, Vo J. 16, No. 3, 2003 , 41 1. Richard Stubbs, ' ‘ Asean 
Plus Three: Emerging Asian Regionalism?" Asian Survey, Vol XL口 ， No . 3, MaylJ une 
2002, 452 
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J apan is seeking cooperation with 10+ 3 countries, but 
because of its impOltant trade and investment links with the 
US and western countries, wants to prevent the forum from 
integrating into an exclusionary economic bloc, and desires 
an East Asian “community" of nations that would include 
10+3 countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, and even 
India. 49 
Japan launched an initiative to set up an Asian Monetary 
Fund in the midst of the Asian crisis as a lender of last 
resort to affected countries, but quickly retracted the idea 
once the U.S. objected to it as an avenue to circumvent 
International Monetary Fund conditionality. Japan desires 
to act as the leader of the region, yet it tries to do nothing 
within or without the 10+ 3 that might earn it the 
disapproval of the U.S. government and harm their close 
bilateral economic relations and security alliance. 
To increase across-the-board and yet more concrete cooperation with 
ASEAN without the presence of a potentially obstructionist foreign 
power, and to some extent, marginalize Taiwan's diplomatic and 
economic involvement with Southeast Asian states, China has worked 
toward institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN 10+ 1 axis within the 
rubric of 10+3. Within 10+ 1, China is taking the leading role in sub-
regional integration with Southeast Asia, with strengthening economic 
ties laying a solid foundation for political, security and other functional 
relationships between China and ASEAN. China is pushing 
institutionalization of the 10+ 1 along the “ASEAN Way," at a pace that 
both China and ASEAN countries are comfortable with. 
10+ 1 has as its genesis the first China-ASEAN Senior Officials' 
Meeting (SOM) at Hangzhou, China, in April 1995. Despite Beijing's 
initial reluctance to discuss disputes about sovereignty and jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea, following the PLA occupation of the disputed 
Mischief Reef, Chinese senior officials agreed to informal discussions 
on the Spratlys at the first China-ASEAN SOM, and accepted that this 
的 Hund，“ASEAN Plus Three: towards a new age ofpan-Asian regionalism?" 394, 401 
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lssue WO叫d be broached and tabled in subsequent China-ASEAN 
meetings.50 At the second China-ASEAN SOM in June 1996, Beijing 
avowed the norms of restraint, non-use of force , and peaceful 
settlement of conflict.51 
The China-ASEAN dialogue was instituted in July 1996. There are five 
parallel mechanisms that form the overall structure of the ASEAN-
China dialogue. They are the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation 
Commi仕ee (ACJCC) , ASEAN-China Senior Officials Political 
Consultations, ASEAN-China Joint Committee on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation, ASEAN-China Joint Science and Technology Committee, 
and ASEAN Committee in Beij ing. Inaugurated in F ebruary 1997, the 
ACJCC acts as the coordinator of all ASEAN-China dialogue 
mechanisms at the working group level, 52 and manage the small 
ASEAN-China Co-operative Fund which finances studies for joint 
projects. Oecember 1997 witnessed China's attendance at the first 
informal China-ASEAN summit. 
At their summit in 2002 , China and ASEAN signed four key 
agreements: The Oeclaration on Conduct (OOC) in the South China 
Sea; the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation and Establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area; 
the Joint Oeclaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional 
Security Issues; and the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Agricultural Cooperation. 
With the OOC, Beijing reaffirmed the norms of restraint, non-use of 
force , and peaceful settlement of conflict in handling its disputes with 
other claimants over the South China Sea islands. The Sino-ASEAN 
Economic Agreement in 2002 aims to build a China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (CAFT A) by 2010. A patiicularly enticing aspect of the 
Agricultural Memorandum to Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar 
50 Jurgen Haacke , Aseon 's diplomotic ond security culture, origins, development ond 
p ro:,pects (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon 2003 ,) 125 
5 1 Haacke, Aseon 's diplomotic ond security culture, 129 
52 ASEAN Secretariat,“The First Meeting of the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation 
Committee : Beijing, 29-28 February 1997, Jo int Press Release," ASEAN Economic 
Bullet巾， July 1997 , 87 
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is its "Early Harvest" provision, by which China undertakes to extend 
preferential tariff and other treatments to the agricultural, fruit and meat 
imports of these countries immediately without expectation of 
reciprocity for five years. The Joint Declaration on Non-traditional 
Security aims to promote cooperation in combating cross-border drug 
smuggling, human trafficking, money-laundering, spread of epidemics, 
and terrorist activities. 
Under the 10+ 1 mechanism, China has identified five important areas 
for cooperation, in agriculture, information technology, human resource 
development, mutual economic investments, and development of the 
Mekong River Basin. Accordingly, since 2002 , a tri-annual summit has 
been held among heads of government and business leaders from China, 
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar, countries 
connected by the river, on the development of the highways, railways 
and custom services linking the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), 
and the PRC government has backed soft loans to Chinese business 
interests in the Mekong region. 53 Trade between China and the other 
GMS countries totaled US$ 25.82 billion in 2004.54 
At the i h China-ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia, held on 8 October 
2003 , China entered into a strategic patinership agreement with 
ASEAN , and became the first non-ASEAN state to formally accede to 
ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which commits 
China to respecting the principles of nonaggression and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of signatory states. 
Although a number of ASEAN states actually compete directly with 
China in terms of low-wage labor-intensive export manufacturing 
industries, J_' China is a vast marketplace for ASEAN produce, and 
ASEAN leaders and business persons generally perceive China and the 
proposed CAFT A to be much more as an opportunity than as a threat. 
53 Clarissa Oon,“Beijing to spur investment with soft loans," Slraits Times (Singapore), 5 
July 2005 , 9 
54 Xinhua, "Ministry of Commerce outlines measures for promoting GMS Co-op," 
http ://engl ish.sina.com/business/ 1I2005/0703/370 18 .html 
55 Stubbs、“Asean Plus Three," 452 
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Trade between China and ASEAN reached US$ 105.8 billion in 2004.56 
lt has been said that,“ASEAN countries have realized that China has 
already become the fastest engine of Asia' s economies, and whoever 
gets on this locomotive wiII have a bright future. ,,57 China has carried a 
trade deficit with ASEAN as a whole for the past five years. Unlike 
during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, with the 
improvement in the ASEAN economies, diversion of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) from Southeast Asia to China is no longer much of 
an lssue. 
The political initiative to promote regional stability and coordinate 
economic policies in East Asia seems to come mostly from China，的 it
will be difficult for Japan to make its weight felt as long as its economy 
remains more or less stagnant，的 it has been for most of the last fifteen 
years. Still, neither 10+3 nor 10+ 1 has yet to establish specific rules or 
the mechanisms to enforce the common objectives of member-states.58 
China's sheer size, its authoritarian political structure, and its history of 
hegemonic a位empts over parts of Southeast Asia, together with the 
unresolved claims to the South China Sea islands , also make it hard to 
dispel the unease that Southeast Asian countries have toward China. 
China's activism in a multilateral setting is a reassuring signal to its 
neighbors, but not a guarantee of future non-a"ggressive actions. 
China's Approaches to the Shanghai-5 / SCO 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 , the primary concerns of 
the Russia, China, and the new states of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan , Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan - have 
progressively shifted from demarcating boundaries to promoting border 
security to establishing regional confidence-building measures to 
combating what regional policy makers have termed the “ three evils" 
一 Oon‘“Beijing to spur investment with soft loans." 
~ I Hou Songling and Chi Diantan巨， “Dongnanya yu zhongya: Zhongguo zai xinshiji de 
diyuan zhanlue xuanze，刊 (“Southeast Asia and Central Asia: China 's geo-political 
strategic choice in the new century," ) Zongguo Waijiao (Chi月。 's Foreign Affoil吟，
August 2003: 8, 28 
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of terrorism, religious extremism and secessionism. To address these 
transnational issues and cha11enges, Russia, China and the Central 
Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan decided to 
create a regional multilateral forum dubbed the Shanghai-Five - so-
called because the first meeting of the heads of state of the grouping 
took place in China' s Shanghai on the 26 April 1996. S ince June 2001 , 
with the admission of Uzbekistan into the grouping, its name was 
changed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO 
has in recent years added to its core focus of fighting the “ three evils" 
by advancing cooperation in the fields of interdicting a11 forms of cross-
border smuggling and promoting economic interaction among member 
states. 
The SCO, and its predecessor, the Shanghai-5, is the first multilateral 
security organization largely initiated and promoted by China. The 
SCO looks we11-institutionalized, as seen from the structure of its 
organization. 59 
On 15 June 2001 , the day on which the SCO was founded in Shanghai, 
吐le ‘ Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and 
(Religious) Extremism' was signed by leaders of the member states, 
clearly defining the cardinal purpose of the organization. China' s main 
goal is to gain the cooperation of Central Asian governments to reduce 
the threat ofMuslim Uighur separatism in Xinjiang. 
The SCO Charter, which provides the purposes, principles, structure 
and operational rules of the organization, by laying a legal foundation 
for its growth, 60 was adopted by the heads of SCO states meeting in St. 
Petersburg in June 2002. 
The supreme decision-making body of the SCO is the Council of Heads 
of States. It holds regular sessions once a year and makes decision and 
issues instructions on a11 important matters pertaining to the 
orgal1lZat lOn. 
59 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Website, 
l11tp://v.'ww.sectsco.org/aeticle.asp?id temp2= I &Langua!!eID=~(Last accessed 1 September 2005) 
60 Wang, “ China's Multilatera1 DipJomacy in the New Millennium," 182 
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Below this level of meeting, the Council of Heads of Government has 
held regular meetings once a year since September 2001 to discuss 
strategies of multilateral cooperation and priorities for the organization, 
as weIl as to approve the budget for the following year. 
Lower down, there exists the mechanism of annual meetings of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Transpo此， Culture, Defence, 
Law Enforcement; Heads of Department on Extreme Measures 
(disaster coordination), and General Public Prosecutors. 
SCO functions are coordinated by a Council of National Coordinators 
of SCO member states meeting at least three times a year, and joint 
working groups under the charge of senior officials in the relevant 
ministries of member states have been established to tackle issues of 
common concem. 
The SCO has two permanent bodies61 : 1) The SCO Secretariat, located 
in Beiji峙， consists of 30 people delegated by the member countries in 
proportion to their financial contribution to the SCO budget. The 
Secretariat works closely with the Council of National Coordinators in 
preparing drafts, making suggestions, implementing resolutions, and 
exercising budgetary supervision for the organization. 62 The largest 
contingent of delegates is 台om the PRC. 2) The Regional Anti-
Terrorist Structure (RA TS) in Tashkent. The Secretariat was 
inaugurated on 15 January 2004 and the 1 st meeting of RA TS 
Executive Committee was on 31 October 2003. The combine budget 
for both the Secretariat and the RA TS came to $3.5 million in 2004, 
with China and Russia each paying 240/0 of i t.的
6 1 RIA Nev.'s Agency、 Moscow， in Russian 0315 , "Russian diplomat appointed deputy 
CEO of Shanghai Cooperation Organization," BBC MonÍtoring Former Soviet UnÍon , 15 
January 2004 ‘ l 
62 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization website, 
l11tp:llwvvw.sectsco.org/aeticle.asp?id temp2= 1 &Language !D=2JLast accessed I Septem b巴r 2005) 
的 Xinhua News Agency台“SCO Major Force in Jnternational Counter-terrorism," 16 
January 2004 
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Both the SCO Executive Secretary and the RA TS Executive Committee 
Director are appointed by the Council of Heads of States for a period of 
three ye訂s. The first SCO Secretary-General is China's Zhang 
Deguang, and the first Director of RA TS is Vyacheslav Kasymov from 
Uzbekistan. Members take turns according to the Russian alphabetical 
order of their country's name to serve a three year term. The Secretary 
is assisted by three deputies in charge of political-security, economic-
humanitarian, and administrative-legal-budget affairs, and an assistant 
secretary in charge of external and media relations.64 
What accounts for the high degree of institutionalization in the SCO 
structure in the relatively short period of 5 years since it was formed? 
. The process of institutionalization was already started under the 
predecessor ofthe SCO, the Shanghai-Five forum. 
The “Shanghai-5" mechanism for boundary demarcations 
and confidence-building between the head of state of China, 
and those of Russia, Kazakhstan, T吋 ikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, was established with the holding of its first 
summit in Shanghai on 26 April 1996. On 26 April 1997, 
heads of the five countries held a second meeting in 
Moscow and signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of 
Military Forces along China's borders with Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
At the third summit in Kazakhstan's Almaty on 3 July 1998, 
discussions expanded into non-border issues such as 
cooperation against their common threat of terrorism, 
religious fundamentalism, and separatism, which soon 
became the focus of the Shanghai-5 and subsequently the 
SCO. At the fomih summit in Kyrgyzstan ' s Bishkek on 24 
August 1999, the group agreed to institute constant 
meetings between officials of various government 
depm1ments in member-states. 
“ The Shanghai Cooperation Organization website, 
http ://www.sectsco.org/aI1i cle.asp? id temp2= 1 &LanguagelD=L(Last a郎郎sed I September 2005) 
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1n November 1999, the heads of law enforcement agencies 
among the Shanghai-5 countries met for the first time. The 
first meeting of defence ministers of the group was held in 
Kazakhstan's Astana in March 29-30, 2000. “ The first 
meeting ofthe group's foreign ministers was held on 5 July 
2000, just before the fifth Summit at Tajikistan's Dushanbe. 
The Dushanbe Summit mooted the idea of establishing a 
Shanghai-5 Council of National Coordinators to foster 
regularized coordination for organizational support, which 
was realized under the SCO. These set of important 
meetings would become annualized and institutionalized 
when the Shanghai-5 became the SCO the following year, 
with the addition ofUzbekistan. 
• The operating principles of the SCO are under girded by shared 
norms and interests among its member states. 
Although the Shanghai-5 / SCO has stated that it is not a 
military alliance directed against any external parties, 66 
both leadership of China and Russia has been united in a 
strategic partnership since 1996 against what they see as 
“hegemonism" and "unipolarity." 
Being newly-independent, Central Asian countries desired 
international atlention and recognition, the support of 
Russia and China to help them fight Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan and the Hizb-ut-Tahr汀， and a reduction of their 
trade dependence on Russia, and these aims could be 
achieved in part through joining up with China first in the 
Shanghai-5 and subsequently the SCO. Even after the 
overthrow of President Askar Akayev, the new leadership 
of Kyrgyzstan apparently saw enough value in the SCO 
(,5 Andrei Kiriilov , “ Chi Haotian hails Shanghai Five military cooperation," ITAR-T ASS 
News Wire. April3 , 2001 , 1 
66 Xu Tao,“Lun Shanghai hezuo zuzhi de jizhihua," (“On the institutionalization of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization,") International Politics (China), 2003 : 10, 1 
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such that it did not even contemplate withdrawing from the 
orgamzat lOn. 
The Dushanbe Declaration issued at the closed of the fifth 
summit of Shanghai-5 leaders on July 5, 2000, confirmed 
the right of each state to choose its own path of political, 
economic, and public policy development, declared against 
intervention into the internal affairs of other states under 
the pretext of “humanitarian intervention" and “human 
rights protection," and support efforts by member states to 
protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and social stability of member states. 67 This declaration, 
more than any other document, defines the norms of the 
Shanghai-5 forum and the succeeding SCO. 
At the time that the SCO was founded , member states 
quickly set about planning for the organization a flag and 
emblem, permanent secretariat, regional anti-terrorist 
structure, and budget.68 
Cooperation among governments against terrorism, 
religious fundamentalism , and separatism has remained the 
focus of the SCO, although it has expanded to economic 
cooperation in the form of encouraging trade, investment 
and infrastructural development among member countries 
since the 2003 SCO summit at Moscow, and the crackdown 
on the trafficking of illicit arms, ammunition, explosives, 
and particularly narcotics ， 的 as well as organized 
international crime, illegal immigration and mercenary 
activities; 70 since the 2004 summit at Tashkent. 
的 ITAR-TASS News Wi悶，“approve of special services cooperation," July 5, 2000 
68 A. Lukin‘“Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Problems and Prospects," 
Jnternational Affairs (Russia), 50, no.3 (2004), 34 
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The joint declaration at the end of the July 2005 SCO 
summit at Kazakhstan' s capital Astana called for a time-
table for the withdrawal of US-led anti-terrorist forces in 
Afghanistan, and for a deadline to end the use of temporary 
facilities and their military contingents' presence in SCO 
countries, citing the end of large-scale operations against 
terrorism in Afghanistan. 71 In the aftermath of the 
September 11 , 2001 attacks on the US , two SCO countries , 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, provided air-base facilities for 
use by the US military in its actions against the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan, which the US has accused of 
harboring the master-minds of the 9-11 attacks. 
Accordingly, the Uzbek govemment gave U.S. forces 180 
days from 29 July 2005 to evict its Karshi-Khanabad air 
base.72 
According to SCO Secretary-General Zhang, the 
organization has initiated 120 projects concerning customs 
cooperation, cross-border transpOliation, laws and 
regulation coherence, energy, and railway construction. 73 
The organization has set itself the goal of realizing the free 
f10w of goods, services, capital and technology within a 
twenty-year time frame from 2005.74 
. The driving force of the SCO is clearly China, as it is an obvious 
tool for enhancing Chinese power and in f1 uence in the region. 
China's main goals are to stabilize the region, which is 
turning out to be a potentially impOliant source of oil and 
gas for its growing economy, and to get the support of 
Central Asian governments in its fight against U ighur 
71 Hu Qihua, "SCO summit f1exes anti-terror muscles," China Daily, 8 August 2005 
72 Jim Garamone,“Uzbeks ask U.S. to leave Karshi-Khanabad ," AFP (執lashin t，r1:on) ， 1 
J\ugust 2005 
Ij Xinhua News Agency,“SCO summit starts to push for closer regional coopel訓ion，"
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separatists to deny them cross-border funding, equipment 
or sanctuary. Jiang Zemin became the first PRC Head of 
State to visit Central Asia in 1996. 75 Since then, either the 
president or prime minister of China has visited the region 
at least once a year. 
To avoid the SCO from being sidelined by the post 9-11 
US military presence in Central Asia, Beijing pushed hard 
for the institutionalization of a regional anti-terrorist center 
at the 2002 St. Petersburg summit. 76 At that summit, China 
managed to pressure the group into taking a stand against 
the deployment of the theatre missile defense (TMD), for 
such a US missile shield would make China's relatively 
small nuclear deterrent force obsolete. 
Re f1ecting China's goal of building comprehensive 
strategic partnerships, at its 2003 annual meeting in 
Moscow, the SCO expanded its focus from primarily 
counterterrorism to economic cooperation. 77 The Chinese 
president made a strong push for an early focus on building 
transport infrastructure throughout Eurasia.78 
The joint military exercise between Chinese and Kyrgyz 
forces in October 2002, and the joint “anti-terrorist" 
exercise of SCO militaries at the Chinese-Kazakh border in 
August 2003 effectively tums the grouping into a quasi-
military bloc. When China and Russia engaged in their first 
joint military exercise in August 2005 , only observers from 
other SCO member states were allowed. 
Further reflecting China's instrumental role and influence, 
a permanent secretariat largely funded by the PRC was 
75 Zhu, “ Lun Zhongguo mulin zhengce and lilun yu shijian," (“On the theory and practice 
of China's neighborly policy,") 18 
76 Xinhua Ne~s Agency, “ Jiang Zemin Calls for Regional Anti -terrorism Mechanism 
between SCO," January 7, 2001 , 
77 Shambaugh, “ China Engages Asia," 74 
78 ‘Hu Jintao ' s Speech at the SCO Moscow Summit," People 旨 Dai妙， May 30, 2003 
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created in Beijing in late 2003 , 79 and where the PRC 
maintains the largest number of staff members. China's 
Zhang Deguang, former ambassador to Russia, became the 
first SCO Secretary-General. 
Ahead of the 2005 SCO summit at Astana, China ' s 
President H u Jintao separately forged a strategic 
partnership with Kazakhstan 's President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, pledging to support Kazakhstan's entry into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in exchange for a 
commitment from the latter to help it counter a口empts by 
Xinjiang's Islamic rebels to seek sanctuary in 
Kazakhstan. xo Beijing would also like the Kazakh leader to 
guarantee delivery of the mutually agreed upon amount of 
oil and gas through the pipelines which the Chinese are 
building across his country. 
Hu said that China would set aside a special fund for the 
training of 1500 people from other SCO countries within 
the next three years, 81 chie f1y in the areas of economic, 
scientific-technical and humanitarian cooperation. 
China implicitly condoned the harsh actions of Uzbekistan 
President Ismail Karimov in putting down protests in 
Andijan , eastern Uzbekistan, in May 2005 , with SCO 
Secretary Zhang from China calling the disturbance “a 
terror attack carried out by armed religious extremists." “ 
When Russia suggested admitting India as an observer, 
China agreed only if Pakistan and Iran were also admitted 
79 Louisa Lim,“China and Central Asia Boost Ties," BBC News World Edition, 
September 24 , 2003 ‘ l1tto ://nevvs.bbc.co.ukl l /hi /world/asia-oaci fìc/3130852.stm 
的 Goh Sui Noi‘“Security summit will aJso discuss economic ties，叫 Straits Times 
(Singapore). 5 July 2005 
81 Xinhua News Agency, '‘Hu: SCO 扣ture hinges on action." 6 JuJ y 2005 
82 Goh,“Security summit will aJso discuss economic ties ." 
29 
as observers at the same time. 83 Hence,. Iran, Pakistan and 
lndia became observer members of the SCO at its 2005 
summit, joining Mongolia, which was admitted to observer 
status the year before. The close relationship between 
China, Russia and Iran may prove to become a major 
obstacle to American policy in the Central Asian region. 
Given China's dedication to developing the SCO, the only way in 
which the SCO can fail is if Russia and a majority of its Central Asian 
members perceive that it is no longer in their interest to stay in the 
organization, but the SCO has so far remained intact despite one 
unconstitutional change in the leadership of a constituent state, albeit a 
small one. This is due not to the fear of displeasing China by 
withdrawing from the organization, but rather to the shared norms and 
interests that member states have, and in the greatest likelihood, to the 
high level of institutionalization exhibited by the SCO, constituting a 
thickening web of regularized engagement and multiplying issues 
within which the member states are enmeshed. 
Conclusion 
The record of China' s a吐empts at institutionalizing regional 
multilateral organizations is uneven. China has successfully pushed for 
a high degree of institutionalization with the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) because the only other m司or participant (Russia) 
is a friend, and members have a salient accord in pursuing the aims of 
anti-telTorism and trade promotion. The Six-Party Talks (6PT) is 
minimally institutionalized because, although the issue of nuclear 
disarmament of N orth Korea is important to China, there 也.e many 
heavy players with their own agenda in the forum (U.S., Japan, and 
Russia), North Korea itself is a maverick, and the participants have yet 
to completely agree on what they should do to induce North Korea to 
give up its nuclear weapons program. The semi-institutionalized 
83 "Shanghai hezuo zuzhi - weiyi吼叫 Meiguo shili jieru de guoji zuzhi," (“Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization - the only international organization without the intrusion of 
United States power,") 15 June 2005 , http ://www.sina.com.cn 
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character of the ASEAN + 3 ref1ects the consultative nature of the 
forum that leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and China, Japan and South Korea have decided upon, and 
competition for in f1 uence between China and Japan. To increase 
cooperation with ASEAN without the presence of foreign power丸
China has worked towards institutionalizing a separate China-ASEAN 
axis within the rubric of ASEAN + 3. 
There seems to have been much agreement among scholars in the field 
of integration studies that increasing the number of participants in a 
multilateral institution will lead to a decrease in its effectiveness, with 
more players pursuing their own agenda within the group , increasing 
transaction costs, and complicating the lines of communication.84 Yet, 
increasing the number of parties in the talks on North Korean nuclear 
disarmament from four to six did not seem to have increased or 
decreased the effectiveness of the forum in moving it closer to finding a 
resolution. By expanding its membership from five to six with the 
addition of Uzbekistan, the transformation of the Shanghai-5 into the 
SCO actually saw more measures of institutionalization being put in 
place. When China dealt with ASEAN in a more bilateral fashion by 
pushing cooperation in the 10+ 1 within the rubric of the 10+3 , the 
number of countries involved obviously went down-, but the efficacy of 
this sub-grouping seems to be higher than the larger forum. Of course, 
it will be hard to predict the future effectiveness of the 10+3 when it 
turns into the East Asian Community in December 2005 with the 
addition of lndia, Australia, and New Zealand, or that of the SCO, with 
the admission of Mongolia, lran, Pakistan and India as observers. 
There exists a minority view that multilateral institutions that start out 
small wilI tend to develop a deeper web of cooperation than those that 
start out with many members, if the cooperative norms of behavior are 
already well-established by the initial players and adhered to by the 
new-comers. 85 Indeed, there is some support for this contention, 
looking at the expansion of the 4PT into the 6PT, the Shanghai-5 into 
84 Huntington, Political Order. 22. Tae-hyo Kim, “ The Six-Way Multilateral Approach 
Dilemma for EveηI Party." Korea and World Affai內， Vo\.27 NO.3 (1 07) 2003, 353 
85 George W. Downs ‘ David M. Rocke. and Peter N . Barsoom , ,‘Managing the Evo lution 
of Multilateralism," lnternational Organization 52:2 (Spring 1998 )可 397-419
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the SCO, and ASEAN into the 10+3 /1 0+ 1, which saw the broadening 
and deepening of institutionalization measures. However, this 
postulation cannot explain the differences in the degree of 
institutionalization among these forums in which China played a, if not 
the, leading role. Neither, it seems, can China's apparent equal 
enthusiasm in promoting both regional multilateral security forums, 
such as the 6PT and SCO, or economic ones, such as the ASEAN+ 3 
and ASEAN+ 1. 
East Asian regionalism has been criticized by many observers for 
lacking a country that is ready and able to play a leadership role in 
overriding structural difficulties and resolving differences of opinion in 
integrating the region. China is apparently willing to bear the cost of 
leading the drive for greater institutionalization in Asian regional 
organizations because, as compared to reaping the benefits of raising its 
international status and securing a peaceful and stable external 
environment for continuing its economic growth, the price tag of 
leadership, such as hosting and setting the agenda for 6PTs, opening up 
its market to agricultural imports 企om the poorest Southeast Asian 
countries with very low or no tariffs, or budgeting for a secretariat and 
its permanent staff for the SCO, is really quite low and can be kept 
relatively well-hidden for a large and authoritarian country like China. 
As well , the states of Southeast Asia and Central Asia are still 
concerned with keeping their sovereign independence by subscribing to 
the principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighboring states, 
and to the extent that this thinking is shared by China, pursuing 
cooperative security and functional interdependence with China could 
pose very little risk to the other Asian states. 
This is not the place to discuss whether China ' s multilateral diplomacy 
is a carefully cultivated effort to advance national interests by 
“reassun:時 those who might collaborate against a putative China 
threat,,,86 or a genuine conversion to cooperative definitions of national 
security socialized by the experience of participating in multilateral 
的 Avery Goldstein,“An Emerging China 's Emerging Grand Strategy, A Neo-Bismarkian 
Turn?" in lnternational Relations η7e01y and the Asia-Pac叭c‘ ed. G. John lkenberry and 
Michael Mastanduno (New York: Co\umbia Universi ty Press, 2003)‘ 73 . 
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organizations. As China scholar Susan Shirk has noted, realpolitick 
pursuit of national interest does not preclude an idealist commitment to 
the values of multilateralism, as was the case of the U.S. after World 
War II, which was able to convince other states that it would not 
threaten them by creating !p-ultilateral global institutions and submitting 
itself to their authority.OI Suffice to note that China's enthusiasm 
toward crafting, sustaining and deepening regional multilateral 
institutions has only waxed urunitigated. 
In Asia, the challenge is to deepen multilateral negotiations and build 
institutions. However, institutionalization of the Asian regional 
multilateral processes, in many ways led by China, faces two major 
limitations. Firstly, no one in Asia is seriously contemplating any 
schemes for a customs union or common currency, let alone political 
federation on the scale of the European Union, given the vast 
differences in the history, culture, and institutions of regional countries. 
Secondly, the proliferation of bilateral trading arrangements in East 
Asia, with its “spaghetti bow 1 effect with different rules and 
regulations," may lead to an “ interlocking web of FTAs in the region," 
but may also hinder the process of regional integration. oo 
To the extent that China is pushing for the institutionalization of 
regional multilateral processes, the scope of its achievement has been 
shown to be limited by two primary considerations - distribution of 
power among the forum participants and whether the major players are 
friendly towards China or not so, which showed up China's influence 
relative to the other members; and the imp0l1ance of the issues that the 
specific forum is set up to deal with, which shows up the relevance and 
saliency of China ' s proposals to itself and participating countries. 
Whether China's institutionalization objectives can transcend these 
realist constraints remains to be seen. 
87 Shirk, ,‘China.s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific," 5 
88 Ba, “ The Politics and Economics of ‘East Asia' in ASEAN-China Relations ," 182 
33 
6PT 
Appendix 
Table of Comparative Institutionalization 
10+3 
President meeting 
(x1) 
Vice President meeting 
坐坐
Premier meeting (x6) I Premier meetin 
Host: PRC Beijing I 10+3 Unit established I Secretariat 
State Guest House I within ASEAN Secretariat I RATS 
Chairman's post-talk I ASEAN TAC signatory I Cha巾r
Statement 
34 
6PT 10+3 sco 
Meeting of Ministers Meeting of Ministers (12 Forums) Meeting of Ministers 
-Level of Vice/Deputy -Foreign Affairs 
- Foreign Affairs 
Foreign Minister Till July 2005 (6x) Till June 2005 (8x) 
Till July 2005 (4x) (3 extraordina叩)
(Irregular) -Economics 
Till September 2004 (7x) 
- Defense 
-Finance 
Till May 2002 (2x) 
Till May 2005 (8x) 
-Culture 
Till April 2002 (1x) 
-Agriculture and Forestry 
Till October 2004 (4x) 
-Economy and Trade 
-Labor 
Till September 2003 (2x) 
Till May 2004 (4x) -Transpo吋
Till Sept 2003 (2x) 
-Tourism 
Till January 2005 (4x) 
-Environmental 
Till October 2004 (3x) 
-Health 
Till April 2004 (1x) 
-Information and Communications 
Technology 
Till August 2004 (1x) 
-Social Welfare and Development 
Till December 2004 (1x) 
-Transnational Crime Meeting 
Till August 2005 (2x) 
-Energy Ministers meeting 
Till July 2005 (2x) 
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6PT 10+3 SCO 
Meetings of Working Meetings of Senior Officials Meetings of Department 
Group Heads Heads 
Head or Deputy Head Senior Officials Meeting on Meeting of Heads of law-
of Bureau in Foreign Transnational Crime enforcement bodies and 
Minist巾， position security services 
below level of Deputy / (Bishkek Group) 
Vice Foreign Minister Till May 2002 (2x) 
ASEAN + 3 Senior Health Meeting of Heads of 
Officials Meeting on SARS held Departments on 
from 8 to 9 June 2003 situations and 
liquidations of 
consequences of 
elemental acts 
Till April 2002 (1x) 
Special Senior Labour Officials Meeting of General 
Meeting on SARS in early July Public Prosecutors 
2003 Till September 2003 (2x) 
Senior Officials Meeting on Meeting of the Council of 
Energy (Energy Policy Working National Coordinators 
Group) Till April 2004 (14x) 
Till July 2003 (2x) 
Senior Officials Meeting on 
“Creative Management for 
Government" May 26 , 2005 
Meeting of RATS Council 
Till March 2005 (4x) 
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